














2016. Routledge. Pages: 187
ISBN 978-1-138-95158-7
It is a well-established and proven fact that long-term 
investment agreements in the extractives sectors (oil, 
gas and mining) are more prone to certain types of risks 
- especially political risks - than in the other sectors. This 
reality manifests itself every now and again under various 
guises. 
In a time of relatively low commodity prices following 
a highly lucrative period both for the investors and the 
host states, scholarly works that point out the cyclical 
relationship between the international energy investments, 
the commodity price, and unilateral host state actions 
become particularly relevant. When commodity prices go 
down or geographical conditions keep investors away, the 
host states craving for investments often start to offer more 
incentives to lure international investors. Once the bulk 
of the investment is sunk and the price enjoys an upward 
trend, then the host states are inclined to change the rules 
of the game and take unilateral actions often underpinned 
by resource nationalistic sentiment to the detriment of the 
investors. 
This relatively short book, mainly based on the author’s Ph.D. 
thesis, attempts to provide yet another clarification to this 
phenomenon of a resource nationalism cycle, which is one 
of the most acute risks that investors in natural resources 
sectors face. 
The book consists of seven chapters including an 
introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 2 sets the scene for 
further analysis and defines the key concepts of the book 
such as foreign direct investment, the resource nationalism 
cycle, obsolescing bargains, and the methods of mitigating 
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it provides a well-designed and well-implemented background 
to the issues to follow. A particularly important argument is 
that the occurrence of resource nationalism in a host state 
mainly depends on the lack of checks and balances on the one 
hand and the existence of political pressure on the government 
on the other. Therefore, it is less likely to witness resource 
nationalism in either authoritarian states (no political pressure) 
or democratic states (existence of checks and balances) since 
they sit on both ends of the political spectrum. It concludes that 
it is easier to adopt such a path in hybrid types of states where 
there is still political pressure on the executive by the public but 
fewer institutional checks and balances.
After providing a general overview of the tools available to 
mitigate the political risk, Chapter 3 delves into perhaps the 
most important contractual mechanism to tackle the political 
risk, the stabilization clauses. Recent scholarly works on 
stabilization clauses often follow similar approaches to the 
issue by discussing various types of stabilization clauses and 
their practical validity and effect, and referring to the view 
of the arbitral jurisprudence, and this book is no exception. 
One of the reasons that this kind of chapter remains mostly 
descriptive without further novelty is that there are no publicly 
available recent arbitral decisions that deal with the new 
forms of stabilization clauses that would assist to create a new 
perspective. 
Chapter 4 revolves around the issue of compensation under the 
international investment regime. The author links the rigidity 
of the stabilization clauses to the compensation regime and 
concludes that there is a need for flexibility in contractual 
terms so that the host states will not have to pay compensation 
as a remedy of their acts even if conducted for legitimate 
public purposes. The book therefore suggests the insertion of 
renegotiation clauses into the contracts instead of inflexible 
stabilization clauses in order to give the state some elbow room 
to act without breaching its promises. Notwithstanding the 
quality of this chapter and its ability to tell the whole story in a 
condensed way, there are still some parts remaining ambiguous 
to the reader. It would have been a more complete approach 
if the author had solidly established the link between the 
stabilization clauses and the consequences of compensation 
which would lead us to the need for a more flexible contractual 
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principles and standards of compensation, the link between 
the stabilization clauses and compensation is left slightly out 
of focus. The difference in terms of compensation between a 
contract that includes a stabilization clause and one that does 
not should have been pointed out clearly so as to make the 
conclusion more persuasive.  
One of the most stimulating chapters of the book deals with a 
case study on Zambia. In chapter 5, the author firstly provides 
the reader with a comprehensive overview of the Zambian 
mining industry and its political and social effects on the 
country. The chapter focuses on Zambia’s copper mining and 
the transformation it has experienced within the last century. 
The value of this chapter lies with its ability to present a 
concrete example of what were discussed theoretically in 
previous chapters i.e. resource nationalism. The author clearly 
presents the interrelationship between volatile copper prices 
and actions taken by Zambian governments either in the 
form of incentives or interferences depending on the price 
level. When the price of copper soared, Zambian governments 
took over the mining companies or presented windfall taxes 
and when the price slumped they were forced to privatize 
those companies by granting tax incentives to international 
investors due to the difficulty in keeping the country on 
track. However, the deficiency in establishing a powerful link 
between the compensation issue and the other stories being 
told continues in this chapter too. Even though Zambia is a 
good example to show the resource nationalism cycle at work, 
it does not provide the author with enough room to elaborate 
more on the compensation issue since the compensations 
awarded by Zambia after nationalization were determined by 
negotiations between the parties and not by arbitral tribunals. 
Furthermore, these examples were ones of compensation 
in the face of nationalization and not for a mere breach of a 
stabilization clause.
The book concludes by highlighting the importance and 
the need of a more flexible contractual environment to be 
able to adapt the contractual relationship to the changing 
circumstances. It proposes the use of renegotiation clauses 
instead of stabilization clauses and also argues that even in 
the absence of such a clause, there might be a duty arising from 
rebus sic stantibus principle to renegotiate a contract, albeit 
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definition of the renegotiation clause and leaves it like that; 
but he goes on to provide a road map on what to do in the case 
of a failure of renegotiations, which is a valuable contribution 
to the literature. 
Overall, the book represents a valuable and significant 
contribution to the body of scholarship on the resource 
nationalism problem, stabilization and renegotiation clauses; 
its suggestions are well grounded. The case study on Zambia in 
particular offers a basis for testing and proving the arguments 
relevant to the resource nationalism issue. Nonetheless, the 
link between the compensation chapter and the rest of the 
book seems loose. This book would be a good addition to the 
libraries of both scholars and practitioners since it provides a 
treatment of theoretical and practical aspects together. I would 
recommend it to anyone who is interested in international 
investments in the extractives sector and in particular to 
those who focus on “hybrid” types of states as the author does, 
since protecting an investment against the possible impact 
of resource nationalism should be at the forefront of an 
investment plan in those areas. 
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